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CHARITY LAW BULLETIN
No. 129
December 20, 2007
Editor: Terrance S. Carter
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NON-COMPLIANCE RESULTS IN COURT-ORDERED WIND UP OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORPORATION UNDER THE CORPORATIONS ACT (ONTARIO)
By Jacqueline M. Demczur, B.A., LL.B.
Assisted by Kimberley A. LeBlanc, B.A., LL.B., Student-at-Law
A. INTRODUCTION
In a judgement released on October 3, 2007, the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice (the "Court") ordered that a church,
incorporated by letters patent pursuant to the Corporations
Act (Ontario)1 (the "Act"),
be wound up for various statutory breaches. In Warriors
of the Cross Asian Church v. Masih,2
the Court attempted to clarify the application of the Act
to not-for-profit corporations. In this regard, some of the
case law has been interpreted to stand for the proposition
that not-for-profit corporations are not required to strictly
adhere to all of the technical requirements of the Act with
respect to the corporate procedures of their meetings. However,
in this decision the Court took the position that where a
corporate breach is not merely technical, but instead affects
the results of an election of a not-for-profit corporation's
board of directors by its members, then the Act should be
applied more strictly.
B. BACKGROUND
The Warriors of the Cross Asian Church (the "Church")
was incorporated pursuant to the Act as a corporation without
share capital on April 3, 1981. The Church's initial Board
of Directors (the "Board") was comprised of its
four founding members, being the original applicants for incorporation,
as prescribed by section 121 of the Act. Between 2005 and
2006, the composition of the Board changed several times.
On September 18, 2005, the Board dismissed a director for
his continued non-attendance at meetings and the belief that
he had voluntarily left the Church. In July of 2006, two additional
directors resigned their position ("Resigned Directors"),
thereby necessitating an election to fill the vacant Board
positions.
On August 3, 2006, one of the Resigned Directors called an
emergency meeting to discuss a "Notice of Intention to
Dissolve," which was received in the wake of the resignations.
At this meeting, the second Resigned Director purported to
withdraw his resignation. Then, on August 4, 2006, the first
Resigned Director who had initiated the previous day's meeting,
called a subsequent meeting of the congregation who then proceeded
to vote out the president of the Board. The two Resigned Directors
then withdrew their resignations and filed a Notice of Change
with the Ministry of Consumer and Business Services to that
effect. On August 20, 2006, the congregation, presumably led
by the Resigned Directors ("Dissident Group"), went
on to elect three new directors to the Board.
A court application was subsequently brought by the Dissident
Group for a declaration that the Board of the Church was validly
elected at the August 20, 2007 meeting. In response, a second
application was brought seeking a determination that the true
members of the Church were the four individuals who were the
original incorporators of Church and, as such, it was only
these four persons, and not the larger congregation of the
Church, who were properly able to elect new directors to the
Board.
C. SUMMARY OF DECISION
The Court extensively reviewed the provisions of the Act
and the Church's repeated violations thereof. Beginning with
the proper forum for undertaking an election of directors,
the Court looked to section 287 of the Act, which requires
that all such elections take place in a general meeting "by
ballot or in such other manner as the by-laws of the corporation
prescribe." The Court found that, given the fact that
the Church had never passed a general operating by-law establishing
its governance structure, the procedure to elect directors
would have to be governed by section 287 of the Act. In determining
that the said provision had not been complied with, the Court
then reviewed the Act in order to determine whether those
who voted at the August 20, 2007 meeting were, in fact, members
of the Church with the requisite capacity to elect directors.
In this regard, section 124 of the Act sets out that a person
or unincorporated association can become a member of the corporation
by a resolution of the board of directors, unless any other
process has been provided for within the corporations, letters
patent, supplementary letters patent, or by-laws. Although
the Dissident Group argued that various mechanisms for determining
membership had been employed by the Church (i.e. making a
donation to the church and attending services regularly) over
the years, the Court found that there had been no such process
provided for within the constating documents of the Church
and, additionally, "that there had never been a comprehensive
determination for the criteria to qualify for membership and
no consistent process for admission". Given the inability
to determine who voted at the August 20, 2007 meeting to elect
directors to the Board, and whether or not they were qualified
to do so as members because the Church did not keep such membership
records, the Court found that it was not possible to know
if the Board was properly elected by members of the Church
as required by section 287 of the Act.
The Court noted that section 287 of the Act additionally
requires that the election of directors take place at a "general
meeting", and that notice to that effect be provided
for3 in writing and be sent
to each shareholder who is entitled to notice at least ten
days before the meeting.4 The
Court determined that the meeting in which the election of
directors took place was not properly called or constituted
because the notice was not in writing but was instead verbally
announced at two consecutive church services. Evidence was
also lacking with respect to whether or not the vote resulting
in the elections was taken by ballot as required by section
287. The Court, therefore, concluded that the election of
the directors on August 20, 2007 was not valid as it did not
comply with the statutory requirements of the Act.
The Dissident Group contended that although the election
did not technically comply with the provisions of the Act,
it should still be declared valid based upon decisions such
as Pathak v. Hindu Sabba5
and Donald Lee and others v. Lee's Benevolent Association
of Ontario and others6 ("Lee").
They contend that these cases stand for the proposition that:
Non-Profit organizations
should not be required to adhere rigorously to all
of the technical requirements of corporate procedure for
their meetings as long as the basic process is far. Nor
should the court be too quick to grant relief in such circumstances
that may only serve to encourage a disgruntled member of
such an organization to seek such relief. Absent some demonstrated
evidence that any irregularities went to the heart of the
electoral process or lead to a result which does not reflect
the wishes of the majority, the court should be loathe to
interfere in the internal workings of such groups.7
The Court distinguished the facts of this case from those
in Lee on the basis that the corporation's violation
of the Act in Lee was merely technical in nature and
did not affect the results of the election. The Court noted
that this could not be said for the breaches of the Act in
the case of the Church. The Court stated that the issue of
whether those who voted were in fact entitled to do so goes
to the very heart of an election. In addition, the Court explained
that the first sentence in the quotation noted above was obiter
dicta and did not form the basis of the court's decision
in Lee.
In support of its position, the Court cited the decision
in Rexdale Singh Sabba Religious Center v. Chattha8
(Rexdale Singh) which highlighted the importance of
complying with corporate governance issues for both charitable
and not-for-profit organizations. In Rexdale Singh,
the appointment of ten new directors was invalidated because
the process used was in contravention of the provisions of
the Act, even though the appointments had otherwise been in
the best interests of the corporation. The Court noted that,
in Rexdale Singh, in the face of no proper procedure
having been taken, the proper members of that corporation
were the original applicants.9
Having decided that the elections were invalid at the August
20, 2007 meeting, the Court then looked to whether it would
be appropriate in this case to return the responsibility for
the Church to the original applicants as sought by the respondents.
The Court concluded that:
To return the operations
of this church to the initial applicants would put people
in charge who have not been involved or shown much interest
in the church in some time. To put the church in the hands
of either side of this disagreement will, I fear, do nothing
more than lead to more disagreement and further disputes
and to the end of this church as a place of worship.10
The Court weighed the harm that would be caused by allowing
the Church to continue to operate without the controls provided
for by the requirements of the Act, and concluded that the
most appropriate remedy was an order to wind-up based upon
the judicial discretion provided for under s. 243(d) of the
Act.
D. CONCLUSION
The judgement in Warriors of the Cross Asian Church v.
Masih assists in explaining the application of the Act
with respect to not-for-profit corporations. Specifically,
this decision has attempted to clarify some confusion, which
was born out in the case law, as to the level of deference
afforded to not-for-profit corporations with respect to the
technical corporate procedure requirements for meetings as
set out under the Act. The Court in this case appears to be
in agreement with the decision in Lee to the degree that where
an error is technical in nature and does not affect the results
of an election of directors or some other serious corporate
matter, some leniency may be afforded to the not-for-profit
corporation. However, where the error goes to the heart of
an important corporate matter, such as the election of directors
in this case, then it appears that the courts will demand
that the internal workings of the not-for-profit corporation
strictly adhere to the requirements of the Act. Where this
cannot be, or has not been, achieved, particularly where the
original incorporators are no longer part of the said not-for-profit
corporation, the courts will invoke their discretion to dissolve
a non-share capital corporation outright.
1 R.S.O. 1990, c. C-38.
2 [2007] O.J. No. 3794.
3 Supra note 1 at s. 294.
4 Supra note 1 at s. 93.
5 48 B.L.R (3d) 207.
6 Unreported, released March 19, 2004.
7 Ibid. at 12.
8 [2006] O.J. No. 328; For more information, see
Terrance S. Carter, "Non-Share Capital Corporations Must
Strictly Adhere to Corporate Governance Procedures",
in Charity Law Bulletin No. 101, October 27, 2006.
9 Supra note 2 at 38.
10 Supra note 2 at 39.
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