DECISION IS WARNING TO SHAM CORPORATIONS
By Terrance S. Carter, B.A., LL.B., Trade-mark Agent and
Nancy E. Claridge, B.A., M.A., LL.B.
A. INTRODUCTION
An Ontario appeal decision has provided useful guidelines
for determining when the corporate veil can be pierced, leaving
directors liable for costs in litigation. In reversing a lower
court decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal in The St.
James' Preservation Society v. Toronto (City), 2007 ONCA
601, suggested that the determination that The St. James'
Preservation Society (the "Society") was a sham
or "man of straw" corporation resulting in the individual
directors being held liable for court costs in excess of $100,000
was premature and required a full hearing on the costs issue.
Instead, the Court of Appeal concluded that the individual
members of the Society did not receive adequate warning in
this case that costs would be sought against them personally
and that the exceptional circumstances did not exist for a
personal costs award to be made against them. This Charity
Law Bulletin will review the decision and discuss its implications
for not-for-profit organizations and their directors.
B. BACKGROUND
The transaction at the centre of the dispute involved certain
lands on which St. James' Cathedral is located in the City
of Toronto. The land on which the cathedral is located was
granted in trust in 1817. The trustees surrendered the 1817
patent in 1820 and a new patent was issued which divided the
land in two separate parcels, each with a distinct trust.
The Rector and Churchwardens of St. James' Cathedral is the
corporation that holds title to the land as trustee ("St.
James"). In 2002, St. James entered into an agreement
with the City of Toronto and a developer to transfer some
of the zoning density from the church lands to the developer's
nearby condominium property. St. James would receive $3.7
million for this transfer and intended to use the funds to
restore church buildings on the property. St. James also entered
into a Heritage Easement agreement and a Section 37 Planning
Act agreement (a Section 37 agreement is an agreement
by the municipality to increase the height or density of a
development in return for the land owner's provision of facilities,
services or matters) with the City of Toronto (the "Transactions").
The Society was incorporated as a non-share capital corporation
on August 7, 2003, with Peter Currie ("Currie")
and Dougall Grange ("Grange") as two of the three
first directors of the corporation and objects to "promote
the preservation and protection of certain historical properties
within the City of Toronto, more specifically
part
of the Episcopal Block A, on the Town of York Plan, municipally
referred to as 106 King West, and locally known as St. James'
Cathedral, and the associated burying ground and church yard."
The Society objected to the Transactions and brought an application
against the City of Toronto and St. James, seeking orders
quashing the zoning by-laws, as well as declaratory relief
with respect to the terms of the trust, the proper use of
the land, and the proper use of the funds raised by the density
transfer.
Although a partial settlement agreement was reached, the
amended application proceeded with respect to five issues:
1. a declaration that the money St. James
received on the density transfer was impressed with a trust;
2. a declaration that the funds cannot be used for the Diocesan
Centre;
3. a determination of the identity of the beneficiaries;
4. an order that the funds remain in court until the Planning
Act agreement conformed to the court's orders; and
5. an order that St. James report to the Society on the use
of the funds.
C. THE LOWER COURT DECISION
On the issues presented by the Society, the lower court held
that the funds received from the density transfer were impressed
with a trust, but that the funds could be used for the Diocesan
Centre. Further, the court held that the beneficiaries of
the trust were the "parishioners of St. James' Cathedral
and the inhabitants of the City of Toronto", a class
that is to be understood disjunctively, thereby rejecting
the position of the Society that the definition should be
read conjunctively and requiring the use of the monies to
benefit both parishioners and inhabitants. The court refused
to grant any other relief sought.
On the issue of costs, the lower court held that St. James
was entitled to its costs on this matter. One of the Society's
positions was that each party should bear their own costs,
since the application was brought in the public interest and
in light of the Society's success. The Society further argued
that the exception order of a personal award of costs was
not appropriate because the Society was acting in the public
interest.
The court examined five issues in determining whether an
unsuccessful litigant should be excused from paying costs
because it was acting in the public interest. These issues
include the following:
1. the nature of the unsuccessful litigant;
2. the nature of the successful litigant;
3. the nature of the litigation - was it in the public interest;
4. whether the litigation had any adverse impact on the public
interest; and
5. the financial consequences to both parties.
On the first issue, the court accepted that the Society was
not acting to vindicate a private interest and did have a
subjective belief in the issues raised. Further, the Society
had a genuine interest in this litigation and that there were
no other potential litigants who were better suited to have
brought this application. However, the fact that St. James
was a private corporation whose work is in the public interest
and who was forced to participate in this litigation militated
against an order forcing St. James to bear its own costs.
In reviewing the third issue, although the court accepted
there was some element of a public interest in the application,
it concluded that the application was not in the public interest
because many of the arguments advanced were totally devoid
of merit and the Society had improperly tried to re-litigate
matters that it had already settled by way of the partial
settlement agreement. Further, the application had an adverse
impact on the public interest as St. James was forced to spend
considerable funds in defending it that could have otherwise
been used to benefit the public. Although a costs order against
the Society would bankrupt it, the court concluded that there
was no reason to refuse a costs order, especially because
it was incorporated with a view to this litigation and had
no prior history of public interest activity.
In order for St. James to obtain the non-party costs award
(i.e. a personal award of costs against individuals that were
not parties to the litigation) against the directors of the
Society, it was necessary to demonstrate that the directors
had status to bring the application themselves, the Society
was not the "true applicant", and the Society was
a sham put forward to protect the true applicants from liability
for costs. In this regard, the court concluded that the directors
could have brought the application in their own names either
as beneficiaries of the trust (i.e. inhabitants of the City
of Toronto) or under the Charities Accounting Act (Ontario).
Noting that there was no evidence that the Society had any
other members or that it represented anyone else, the court
concluded that the directors were the true applicant. In support
of this contention, the court noted that Grange and Currie
controlled the conduct of the litigation and participated
fully throughout the process. Finally, the court concluded
that the Society was "simply incorporated to protect
the directors from personal liability
precisely the
type of improper conduct that justifies the making of a costs
order against a non-party."
D. COURT OF APPEAL DECISION
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the lower court's overall
conclusion that the litigation was not public interest litigation
justified an award of costs against the Society, but that
it was not sufficient to justify an award of costs against
the directors of the Society who were not parties to the litigation.
In this regard, the court stated that "the trial judge's
clear findings that the Society and the appellants had a genuine
interest in this case, that they were not acting to vindicate
a private interest or for personal gain, that the issues extended
beyond the immediate parties and that no other persons were
better suited to raise the novel issues they did, are incompatible
with his decision to award costs personally against the non
parties."
Looking at the procedural fairness issue of awarding costs
personally against non parties, the Court of Appeal acknowledged
that a settlement offer stated that if the offer was not accepted,
St. James would seek costs against the directors of the Society
personally, but described it as a common practice and an issue
that was only raised shortly before the application proceeded.
The Court of Appeal further suggested that had St. James brought
a motion for security for costs in advance of the application
being heard, the issue of the directors' personal liability
could have been raised at that time, but no such motion was
brought. The Court of Appeal also rejected the conclusion
that the Society was a sham corporation, noting that the lower
court had affidavit evidence that suggested other parties,
while not proclaiming to be members of the Society, had similar
concerns with respect to the legality of the Transactions.
As a result, it was the Court of Appeal's opinion that the
lower court would have been in a better position to determine
whether the Society was a sham after it had presided over
a full hearing on the costs issue. Similarly, the court noted
that issues of personal gain and an abuse of process did not
appear to be present in this case like the precedents upon
which St. James was relying. As such, the exceptional circumstances
necessary to exist for a costs award against the directors
personally did not exist according to the Court of Appeal.
E. COMMENTARY
Although the Court of Appeal did not find the exceptional
circumstances present to warrant a personal costs award against
Currie and Grange in this case, the decision should serve
as a warning for others who seek to use the non-share capital
corporation for the purposes of avoiding liability associated
with their public interest litigation activities. The decision
does not preclude a finding by the courts that individuals
that are pursuing personal interests through a sham corporation
will be held liable for costs on a personal basis, whether
or not the litigation can be characterized as frivolous or
vexatious or an abuse of process. In this regard, the decision
suggests that organizations incorporated for the purpose of
pursuing a public interest need to address a number of issues
prior to engaging in costly litigation in order to protect
directors from potential personal liability, including the
ensuring the following:
-
the organization has a genuine interest
in the outcome of the litigation. A history of activity
by the organization related to the public interest issue
may help demonstrate this interest;
-
the organization is not acting to vindicate
a private interest, and the individual directors do not
stand to gain personally from the litigation;
-
the litigation involves novel issues that
have not previously been interpreted by the courts and are
not the subject of settlements; and
-
no other potential litigants would be better
suited to bring the litigation.
As the Court of Appeal noted, if these factors are present,
it takes the litigation out of the realm of an abuse of process,
a basis upon which the court may award costs personally against
individual directors.
F. CONCLUSION
Public interest litigation has an important place in the
legal system, providing an additional check and balance in
society when issues fail to be addressed by the main parties
in transactions. Yet, the practicalities involved with individuals
personally commencing such litigation, i.e. the significant
costs and demands on resources, makes the non-share capital
corporation (either charities and not-for-profit organizations)
a desirable structure, as it permits persons with common interests
to join together for a common cause without exposure to personal
liability for its members. However, it is clear that it is
possible for individuals to abuse the sheltering effects of
a non-share capital corporation for personal gain, as well
as using the structure to commence frivolous or vexatious
litigation while avoiding personal costs. The Ontario Court
of Appeal's decision in The St. James' Preservation Society
v. Toronto (City) provides some important guidance for
groups who have a true interest in public interest litigation
in order to ensure protection for the directors of these organizations.
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