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CHARITY LAW BULLETIN
No. 87
February 8, 2006
Editor: Terrance S. Carter
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BEWARE OF DONATION TAX SHELTER VALUATIONS
By Karen J. Cooper, LL.B., LL.L., and Terrance S. Carter,
B.A., LL.B.
A. INTRODUCTION
Registered charities and donors should be wary
of the valuations provided by promoters of donation tax shelters
following a recent Federal Court of Appeal decision in Nash
v. Canada ("Nash")1
overturning the Tax Court of Canada. The release of the Federal
Court of Appeal's decision coincided with Canada Revenue Agency's
("CRA") Taxpayer Alert dated November 22,
2005,2 reminding potential investors
to exercise caution with respect to certain donation arrangements,
including gifting trust arrangements, leveraged cash donations,
and buy-low donate-high arrangements. This Charity Law
Bulletin will review the recent case law concerning donation
tax shelters and their implications for donors.
B. RECENT CASE LAW
The Nash decision was a consolidation
of actions brought by Caedmon Nash, Barbara Quinn and Susan
Tolley, who brought their cases before the Tax Court of Canada
on behalf of 1,850 taxpayers involved in an art-flip donation
program run by CVI Art Management (the "promoter"),
which they learned about from their financial planners. The
promoter operated a program through which it sold groups of
limited edition prints to individuals, arranged for appraisals,
and located charities and universities to accept gifts of
the prints which could issue official tax receipts. In the
case of Mr. Nash, in October 1999, he paid $8,667 for 85 signed
and numbered prints. Two months later, in December 1999, he
donated 84 of the prints to Ferris State University in Michigan,
a prescribed university under the Income Tax Act ("ITA"),
receiving an official tax receipt for $29,400. If his claim
for a donation tax credit had been allowed, Mr. Nash would
have been entitled to a refundable tax credit of about $13,000
- a net gain of in excess of $4,000.3
The Tax Court of Canada decisions allowed the
taxpayers' claims for the donation tax credit, relying heavily
on the evidence of the taxpayers' appraiser that the fair
market value of the prints donated in Mr. Nash's case was
$29,932, in Ms. Quinn's case was $24,384, and in Ms. Tolley's
case was $23,690. The valuations in each case were based on
the assumption that determining the fair market value of a
group of prints required an aggregation of the value of the
individual prints in various retail markets.
In overturning the Tax Court decisions, the
Federal Court of Appeal indicated that it was incorrect to
assume that the fair market value of a group of items is necessarily
the aggregate of the price that the individual items could
be sold for, suggesting that the Tax Court and the appraiser
ignored the evidence before them that the promoter sold the
prints in groups and that the taxpayers donated the prints
in groups. The Federal Court of Appeal questioned why the
promoter would sell the prints to the taxpayers for less than
1/3 their subsequent value, concluding that there was no credible
explanation for the discrepancy. The Court held that the most
probative evidence of the fair market value of groups of prints
in these circumstances was the actual purchase price paid
by the taxpayers.
These decisions, along with the Federal Court
of Appeal's decision upholding the Tax Court of Canada's decision
in Klotz v. Canada ("Klotz"),4
have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada largely
on the basis that the courts have wrongly substituted their
own judgment for the opinions of certified valuators. In Klotz,
Associate Chief Justice Bowman of the Tax Court of Canada
considered similar circumstances and found that the best evidence
of fair market value was the very transaction through which
the taxpayers purchased the art from the promoter. Mr. Klotz
was one of 660 people who acquired limited edition prints
that were immediately donated to prescribed colleges and universities
under the ITA. The average cost of the prints was $300 yet
the receipt that was issued was based on an average fair market
value per print of about $1,000. Associate Chief Justice Bowman
concluded that the valuations in that case were unrealistic
and stated as follows:
Why chase the will o' the
wisp of an elusive and largely hypothetical [fair market
value] through the trendy up scale art galleries of New
York and ignore the best evidence that is right there before
your very nose? The problem with the claim here, whereby
property is acquired for $5 to $50, sold to the appellant
for $300 and claimed to have a [fair market value] two days
later of $1,000, is that it is devoid of common sense and
out of touch with ordinary commercial reality.5
This passage was quoted with approval by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Nash.
C. COMMENTARY
The Federal Court of Appeal decisions in Nash
and Klotz, together with another recent decision of
the Tax Court of Canada related to the donation of land to
a charitable trust,6 provide
important guidance when reviewing valuation reports for the
purposes of a tax claim. Fair market value generally means
the highest price, expressed in dollars, that a property would
bring in an open and unrestricted market between a willing
buyer and a willing seller who are knowledgeable, informed,
and prudent, and who are acting independently of each other.
However, when reviewing a particular valuation report, the
courts will base their decisions on the particular facts of
a case, including the effective date of the valuation and
the relevant market that needs to be considered. There are
many areas of subjectivity in an appraisal report, including
the selection of valuation methodology, the selection and
input of various variables, the existence of any underlying
assumptions, and the determination of the appropriate level
of market. Registered charities and their advisors should
be wary of appraisals that seem to be "value-driven"
and self-serving, particularly with respect to the new structures
involving software7 and pharmaceutical products. The CRA and
the courts thereafter will not hesitate to challenge such
reports if they seem to be out of touch with commercial reality.
D. CONCLUSION
Legislative proposals to curtail abusive tax
shelter arrangements were again released by the Department
of Finance on July 18, 2005. These amendments contain provisions
which will deem the fair market value of gifted property to
be the cost (usually purchase price paid) to the donor of
the property if the property was acquired in certain situations,
including if it was acquired by the donor as part of a "gifting
arrangement" or within three years of the date of the
donation. For more information on the legislative amendments,
readers are directed to Charity Law Bulletins No. 30
and 76.8
These new provisions are intended to prevent
the transactions considered in the cases discussed above by
limiting the value of the donation tax credit to the price
paid for the gifted property by the donor. However, there
are a number of new tax shelter structures which claim to
be unaffected by these new rules. The lesson to be learned
from these recent cases from the Federal Court of Appeal is
that tax advisors should always remember that just because
a tax claim is supported by an independent appraisal does
not guarantee smooth sailing when it comes to defending the
transaction before the CRA and the courts.
Endnotes:
1[2005] F.C.J. No. 1921
2 Available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/newsroom/alerts/2005/a051122-e.html.
3 Barbara Quinn bought 48 prints for $8,648, which
she donated to InKind Canada and received a receipt in the
amount of $25,280. Susan Tolley purchased 100 prints for $8,025,
99 of which she donated to Fresno Pacific University and received
a receipt in the amount of $28,325. Had their claims for the
refundable donation tax credit been allowed, each would have
been entitled to a refund of about $13,000.
4 [2005] F.C.J. No. 754 (C.A.), aff'g [2004] T.C.J.
No. 52 (T.C.C.).
5 Ibid. at para. 46.
6 Corbett v. Canada, [2005] T.C.J. No. 574
(T.C.C.). In this case the taxpayers donated a piece of property
to a charitable trust. In assessing the taxpayers for 1996,
the Minister used a value for both the charitable gift and
the proceeds of disposition for capital gains purposes which
the taxpayers did not accept. On their appeal to the Tax Court
of Canada, the taxpayers alleged that the property had a value
on December 26, 1996 of $2,843,622, but the Minister's figure
was $394,000. At the hearing, the taxpayers' appraiser testified
that the value was $850,000; the figure put forward by the
Minister's appraiser was $369,000. The Court found inconsistencies
in some of the statements made by the taxpayers' expert appraiser
and, by adjusting some of that appraiser's calculations, concluded
that the fair market value of the property was $363,985.
7 See CIT Financial Ltd. v. Canada, 2004
D.T.C. 6573 (F.C.A.) for a case involving the valuation of
software based on cashflows in a tax shelter context. See
also Malette v. Canada, 2004 D.T.C. 6415 (F.C.A.) and
27 Cardigan Inc. v. Canada, 2005 G.T.C. 1384 (F.C.A.)
for further examples of the Courts reviewing valuation reports
prepared for tax purposes.
8 Theresa L.M. Man "July 18, 2005 Draft Amendments
To The Income Tax Act Affecting Charities Part I -
Definition of Gift & Split-Receipting" Charity
Law Bulletin No. 76 (September 8, 2005), available at
www.charitylaw.ca,
and Terrance S. Carter and Suzanne E. White "Tax Shelter
Donation Schemes" Charity Law Bulletin No. 30
(December 16, 2003), available at www.charitylaw.ca.
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DISCLAIMER: This Charity Law Bulletin
is a summary of current legal issues provided as an information
service by Carters Professional Corporation. It is current only
as of the date of the Bulletin and does not reflect subsequent changes
in the law. The Charity Law Bulletin is distributed with
the understanding that it does not constitute legal advice or establish
the solicitor/client relationship by way of any information contained
herein. The contents are intended for general information purposes
only and under no circumstances can be relied upon for legal decision-making.
Readers are advised to consult with a qualified lawyer and obtain
a written opinion concerning the specifics of their particular situation.
© 2008 Carters Professional Corporation
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